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TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION
The traumatic events of 9/11 shocked the entire world. This single terrorist attack killed more Americans than the state of Japan did on December 7, 1941. The so called "privatization of war" is a major historical change in world politics.
1 9/11 demonstrated that the possession of the greatest military might on earth, including the most advanced technology, cannot itself guarantee security. Every nation in Europe rushed to declare its sympathy and solidarity with the United
States. The French newspaper Le Monde headline on September 13 proclaimed "Nous sommes fous Americans" (We are all Americans). This kind of support was also based on another major deliberation-terrorism does not recognize any borders. No one nation can guarantee that an act of terrorism will not happen on its soil, thus the support post 9/11 became a matter of national security as much as an act of solidarity. Political observers rushed to declare that "the world will never be the same again." US President George W. Bush declared the attacks "acts of war" and shortly thereafter announced the "Global War on Terrorism." Prior to 9/11 the US public perceived international terrorism as primarily an overseas issue and US administrations treated the terrorist threat as a law enforcement problem. This changed dramatically on 9/11. The Global In December 2003 the European Council issued the first European Security Strategy "A secure Europe in a better world". Like the US National Security Strategy, the European Security Strategy sees terrorism as a "growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe." 3 These two strategic concepts are well suited to assess the state of transatlantic relationship after Iraq and to provide an answer of the key question of this monograph, if there is a common approach for combating international terrorism.
This monograph examines whether the US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy provide sufficient strategic consensus to define a basis for a common US and EU approach of combating terrorism. It is guided by the following hypothesis: Achieving the end state of abolishing international terrorism requires an unprecedented international simultaneous synchronization of all instruments of power; diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, and law enforcement since no nation has enough power to build a safer world alone. To achieve their respective strategic goals Europe needs America's military might, America needs European civilian power. Complementarity not competion should be the transatlantic solution for the future effort.
The term "civilian power" was used by the German Professor Hans W. Maul in the early 1970s, analyzing the growing economic power of Japan and West-Germany. 4 He argued "that the term "power" no longer means what it used to: "hard" power, the ability to command others, is increasingly being replaced by "soft" (persuasive) power. how the political leadership will use the available power (means or resources) to achieve the 4 Maull was, of course, referring specifically to the cases of Germany and Japan; but the definition has been regularly used with reference to the EU. See: Karen E. Smith, Still 'civilian power' EU? (London: School of Economics 2003) 5 A similar US-perspective is expressed by Joseph Nye's conception of "soft power"; (he is Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University) "Soft power can be shared and used in a cooperative fashion. European promotion of democracy and human rights help advance shared values that are consistent with American objectives. The Islamic extremists of Al-Qaeda are fighting against western values. European public diplomacy that counters their appeal is beneficial to the United States." See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) 6 Hans W. Maul, "Germany and Japan: The new Civilian Powers," Foreign Affairs (September/ October 1990) : 92-93. strategic goals. The aim of this chapter is to identify what is common and what is different in these strategic papers. The third chapter discusses the key differences in both strategies: The first issue is unilateralism vs. multilateralism; the second issue is preemption vs. prevention; and the final aspect is the question of legitimacy. The final chapter provides conclusions and recommendation for the improvement of the US-EU relationship focused on a complementary approach of combating terrorism.
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Three major trends have had influence on the strategic environment since the 1980s: the end of cold war; the impact of globalization; and the rise of Islamic radicalism. 7 The outline of these major trends, a sketch of the role of the United States and the development of the European Union post Cold War and an additional overview on the current foreign policy making in the United States and the European Union provide the context for the following comparison of the Security strategies of the United States and the European Union.
The end of the cold war system created new major global security problems: First, internal conflicts accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic rivalries were renewed, thereby increasing the number of inter and intrastate conflicts. Second, huge amounts of weapons from the former Warsaw Pact countries were dumped into the global illegal arms market, further enabling national separatist's movements and terrorist's organizations alike. Third, the risks and potential for terrorists gaining access to Weapons of Mass Destruction or fissile material increased significantly.
The second significant strategic trend is Globalization, it increased dramatically in the 1990s. The information revolution is shaping the strategic environment in which conflicts take place. "The entire world will be linked, so that from any stationary or mobile station it will be To achieve a better understanding of the context of the European Security Strategy it is useful to present a short overview how the European Union has progressed from an economic community to a single market to a union, as well as political and security cooperation developed into a common defense concept, expressed in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).
Today the European Union comprises 25 states with over 450 million people, producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP). To understand the decision making process within the EU it is necessary to explain the institutional structure. The Union is divided into a pillar structure, whereby some matters are the competence of the EU Commission and others of the EU Council (i.e. member states acting through the EU's Council structures). The management of external relations is split between Commission and council with neither able to provide overall coordination. The EU Constitution's institutional innovations are especially relevant to foreign and security policy. It provides a "double-hated" European foreign minister, who would serve in both Council and Commission. The appointment of a foreign minister might go some way to answering Henry Kissinger's famous question of whom to call when the United States wants to speak to Europe. But member states will still have final say in foreign policy decisions. Even a powerful EU foreign minister is more likely to be a valued listener, consents-builder and communicator than a decisive, independent actor. In June 2004 the European Council declared that Javier Solana "will be appointed Union Minister of Foreign Affairs on the day of entry into force of the Constitution".
17 The EU-Constitution will give the EU a single legal personality.
This will have implications on the institutional transatlantic cooperation in the future. Since 9/11 the dispute between the "Pentagon Party" and the "State Department Party" has characterized the foreign policy of the United States. The NSS seems to be a policy compromise between the two groups. One the one hand it reflects neoconservative views, like unilateralism and preemption and military superiority. One the other hand it expresses traditional conservative commitments to the United Nations, NATO and the EU. It commits the United States to a multilateral and liberal order, at least in the economic area.
In the EU there are also three different coalitions of member states influencing the foreign policy: The first group could be called "liberal internationalists", committed to a cooperative foreign policy and to working with and through multilateral institutions. This group (including Germany) pursues the foreign policy of a "robust civilian power." It shares a Kantian vision of world, European Kantians are not pacifists; they support the use of military force if necessary, as can be seen in German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's stance on Kosovo and
Afghanistan. Yet military power, they believe, has to be embedded in political and diplomatic efforts. A second group among Europe's foreign policy elites (led by France) thinks primarily in realist "balance of power" terms. This group is concerned about the growth of US-power and promotes a European foreign policy of balancing and building a counterweight to American primacy. The third group is called "European Atlantics" (for example UK) remains strongly committed to preserving the transatlantic partnership almost no matter what.
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COMPARISON OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY Political background and definitions
This chapter presents a comparison of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the European Security Strategy (ESS) in order to identify convergences and differences in these strategic papers. Both documents start from different premises. The NSS is written for one country, the United States the sole remaining superpower in the world. The ESS is different because it has to express the strategic understanding, not of one country, but of an entity of currently 25 member states. These states have a variety of security and defense policies and commitments, a careful balance had to be struck between sometimes conflicting views. Therefore it is formulated as to compromise the view of many. Furthermore the ESS is the first of its kind, whereas in the United States the issuing has been routine, based on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The NSS was published only one year after the horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11. On contrary, the ESS was shaped by debate on the US invasion of Iraq. It was a direct result of the European disagreements over Iraq. After CFSP failed once more during the Iraq crises to produce a common EU stance on a major crisis, the Member 19 Ibid.
states gave the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, the mandate to lead efforts to finally address the issue of where the EU stands as a global actor and how it sees its evolving security instruments meeting that vision.
In order to create a common understanding of the term strategy, the following definition will be used: "Strategy provides direction, its purpose is control, and it is fundamentally concerned with the application of power. The underlying assumption from a national perspective is that states and other competitive entities have interests that they will pursue to the best of their abilities. Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement of these interests through the application of the instruments of power. Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests."
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Because of the focus of this monograph the following comparison is limited to two of these three strategic dimensions: strategic objectives (ends) and ways/ concepts. The threat assessment in both strategic documents will be taken as start point and basis for the comparison.
For the use in this paper the term threat is defined as: "An expression of an enemy's intention, to inflict evil, injury, or damage with sufficient capability to make those intentions realistic, and realistic estimate of reaction time prior to the attack ( four elements of a threat :actor+ intent+ capability + reaction time) The threat level grows with increasing hostility from an enemy, an expanding enemy capability, and an approaching attack." Terrorism is clearly identified as "a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe", for which "Europe is both a target and a base"; the Strategy notes that terrorism "arises out of complex causes", including "the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies." 30 Proliferation of WMD is defined as, "potentially the greatest threat to our security". The ESS states: "The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorists acquire weapons of Mass Destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies." 31 The treat of regional conflicts is outlined as, "both worldwide and at the borders of the EU, which "impact on without necessarily implying that the EU will adopt the same approach to deal with these threats.
Both documents identify the linkage between terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction as the most dangerous security threat. By qualifying terrorism as a 'strategic' threat, the European assessment of terrorism lacks the strong normative dimension put forward in the US document.
The NSS recognizes terrorism as a mean, rather than an end in itself. But neither the NSS nor its more detailed supplementary document, the 'National Strategy for Combating Terrorism' (NSCT), spends much time on the issue of causes. Indeed, given the importance credited to the terrorist threat, the lack of discussion on possible motivations is striking. The NSCT deals only vaguely with underlying conditions such as economic or political frustration. And even then, these are positioned only as factors "that terrorists seek to exploit" for other objectives, saying nothing about fundamental goals other than a desire to produce fear. Most apparent is the total absence of a discussion of the role of radical Islam. States is concerned not only about its own.
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As far as the NSS definition of "Rogue States" is concerned, it is not clear how many of the five identification points a regime needs to meet in order to be qualified as "rogue". The key point is that given the irrational behavior of rogue regimes the NSS fears such states acquire weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. From the perspective of the US President the greatest danger to freedom lies "not only at the crossroad of radicalism and technology", but also in the denial of this threat and/or the failure to act against it. 44 After this evaluation of stated threats, the following section provides the next step, the comparison of the strategic objectives.
Strategic Goals
The overall aim of the NSS is "to help make the world not just safer but better." 45 The cover letter the President submitted along with the National Security Strategy summarizes its main objectives: "We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by organizations, but also affirms the EU's loyalty to international law and the United Nations ('UN'), and stresses the Security Council's primary role regarding international peace and security.
The NSS declares two goals "fighting terrorists and tyrants" and "encouraging free and open societies on every continent", but these goals often conflict. After 9/11 the US administration built a broad coalition for their "Global war on Terrorism". Many of the countries in this coalition -Pakistan or Saudi Arabia -do not share America's commitment to "seeking the rewards of liberty". The NSS does not address this contradiction. Indeed, its core message is that counterterrorism trumps freedom as a priority. But this priority is a logical consequence of the statement in the cover letter: "Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government." This is an important point the Europeans have to realize. Whereas the ESS stresses that a more effective multilateral system is essential for global security, the NSS clearly states, that the United States will not be part of any decisions that are not in line with its national interests. Multilateral action will only be considered if it is beneficial to the United States. This aspect will be further developed later. The next section of the comparison will analyse the stated ways and concepts in each documents, to answer the question, how the national and multinational power will be used to achieve the strategic objectives.
Strategic Ways and Concepts
The NSS lay out a conceptual framework for achieving the above mentioned strategic goals. To defeat existing terrorist organizations the United States will "using all the elements of national and international power. More capable means foremost to " transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defense and more effective use of resources are necessary." But the military aspect is embedded into the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention". In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations. As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include … support for third countries in combating terrorism."
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Under the term "more coherent" the ESS states the "challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments", that should include "better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies" because it "is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organized crime."
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In the last section of this chapter the ESS outline the necessity of "working with partners".
International cooperation is described as necessity. The way to achieve the strategic goals requires multilateral cooperation in international organizations and partnerships with key actors. 
Evaluation
The comparison of ways/concepts indicates the key differences between the two strategies. The NSS stresses the significance of hard power and military solutions, based on the option acting unilaterally and preemptively if necessary. These points and the American understanding of the role of the United Nations and the problem of legitimacy for the use of force will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
The conceptual framework of the ESS can be referred to as comprehensive security. This concept based on the recognition that there are various dimensions of security in the current international environment. The ESS concept of "Comprehensive Security" gives priority to prevention of conflict and instability, but does not exclude the use of force. It demands global action: prevention must aim to safeguard and improve security worldwide. The weakness of the EU as an international actor were clearly exposed when the United States had to led the interventions in the Balkans, first in Bosnia (1995) and later in Kosovo (1999) . There is a broad agreement by analysts and politics that Europeans need to strengthen their military security instrument if it is not become obsolete. The provision of efficient military capability is a prerequisite to implement this agreed comprehensive security approach. It is increasingly clear that the EU see the military dimension of security as an instrument that must be employed in the context of a comprehensive security strategy.
Without the willingness to apply pressure, sanctions and if needed the use of force EU external action will not acquire the credibility it needs to be effective. The EU will be able to use 67 Ibid., 13-14.
military means as an integrated part of a much broader range of political, economic and diplomatic means. This is in line with Kofi Annan's statement: "You can do a lot with diplomacy, but of course you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up by firmness and force." 68 All countermeasures options outlined by the ESS have certain common elements; recognizing that the first line of defense lies beyond EU frontiers; acknowledging that inaction is not an option; and understanding that a military response is not always appropriate but might form one element of a combined response. In this way, the EU can engage in the systematic political engagement of 'prevention. The greatest challenge for the EU and its member states will be the implementation of this concept. A common will and coherence will be curial to the effective implementation of the comprehensive approach, at the level of policy objectives, instruments and means, across the three pillars. Given the scale of the EU and the diversity of the policy fields involved, this is far from an easy task.
Comparison Summary
The comparison of both documents shows that the analysis of the new threats of terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is similar, as well as the stated strategic goals/ ends. The great difference can be found in the ways/ concepts, how the United States on the one hand and the European Union on the other hand intend to counter these threats and to achieve the respective strategic goals/ends. The NSS tends to stress "hard power" and military solutions with the option of preemption and a unilateralist "go it alone approach", but is downplaying the role of the United Nations, the role of Islam, and possible options of civilian conflict prevention. While the ESS sees more the merit in "soft power" that combines economic, diplomatic as well as military assets. A significant part of the ESS call for increasing European capabilities and readiness for "robust engagement". This model of "comprehensive Security, including military 68 UN Chronicle online edition, (www.un.org/pubs/chronicle/1988/issue1/0198p4_2.html.) 1988 capabilities is a new approach to allow the European Union acting as "robust civilian power". In the next chapter the following three key differences will be analyzed in more detail: Unilateralism versus multilateralism, preemption versus prevention and legitimacy for the use of force to achieve strategic objectives
ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENCES Unilateralism versus Multilateralism
The broad unilateralism-multilateralism debate is about overarching ways of viewing the world and the role of the United States and the Europeans. The majority of Europeans are in favor of multilateralism and a comprehensive security approach as expressed in the ESS, whereas from the European perspective the Bush administration acts mainly as unilateralist. From the perspective of the United States neoconservative foreign policy strategists unilateralism is right and realist while they dismissing multilateralism as naïve and unrealistic, soft and weak. To make things even more complicated, in theory the ESS emphasis upon European cohesion and effective multilateralism whereas in reality member states are being pulled by the US bilateral and ad hoc multilateral demands for its "Global War on Terrorism". Or as Joseph Nye expressed it:
"Neoconservatives tend to prefer alliances a' la carte and to treat international institutions as toolboxes into which US foreign policy makers can reach when convenient". security environment and arms control and non-proliferation, but no issue is more central to the overall debate and none more problematic for multilateralists, than the use of force. In the debate over the Iraq-Invasion, multilateralists made a realistic calculation by raising concerns about the potential and negative effects on the Global War on Terrorism if the United States and the European Union disputes and resentments over Iraq ended up hampering cooperation on these other fronts. The influence needed to really win the peace cannot come without a genuinely multilateral effort. And if the peace is not won, much that was won in the war will ultimately be lost. The EU multilateralists need to get more comfortable with US-power ("hard-power"). They have to recognize its scope and options and not just its limit. The United States cannot do it all on its own, but the European Union cannot do very much without US-power. Above all the EU multilateralists have to come to grips with the use of military force. Use of force has four key aspects: When military force should be used; why it is justified; who decides; and how to use it effectively. First, multilateralists must recognize that force cannot always hold back strictly as a last resort. Force should never be a first resort, but in certain circumstances it may need to become an early resort. If tyrants in rogue states or other aggressors know that force will be used only as a last resort, only after the complete pursuit of an array of options, they retain the strategic initiative and tactical advantage. that a more effective United Nation Security Council is as necessary as it is difficult to achieve.
The UN must be more willing and able, with enhanced capacity, to act firmly, decisively and in a timely manner, if it is to live up to its claim to being the priority decision-making body on the use of force. 75 Fourth, EU multilateralists need to be more pragmatic in acknowledging the limits of UN operational role. The UN has numerous strengths, but conducting major military operations is not one of them. Despite UN has largely succeeded in peacekeeping, it has failed for the most part in peace enforcement. 76 John Ikenberry, the Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice,
Georgetown University, has made the point that unilateralists grossly underestimate the ways in which the UN enhance rather than encroach on US power and influence. 77 On the contrary,
Multilateralists too often underestimate how much the UN and other international institutions depend on US leadership. Major military action is much more likely to be effective if led by the United States. A win-win situation can be achieved by which the United States comes to recognize the UN as essential and the UN recognize the United States as crucial to their being essential. Simply attacking the other side for its shortcomings is always an easier route than dealing with the weakness of one's own position and paradigms. Unilateralism has its weakness, but so too does multilateralism. We need an intensive and through political and intellectual debate, bashing the other side is not enough.
Preemption versus Prevention
Another controversial issue in the NSS and ESS is their respective perspective of preemption and conflict prevention. Before considering the relevance of this issue it is necessary to clarify in detail the meaning of the two terms prevention and preemption: Both terms are rooted in Latin verbs "praevenire" (to forestall) and "praemere" (to buy before others Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary two of the meanings of the verb "prevent", relevant in this case, are "to deprive of power or hope of acting or succeeding" and "to keep from happening or existing" 78 Until recently prevention was widely used in strategic discourse to refer to crisis prevention or preventive deployment as an alternative to the use of force. The potential for confusion is even greater when it comes to preemption. Although the meaning of the verb preemption is "the right to buy before others", its derived meanings are much broader. Beyond the principle of imminence, that largely defines the concept of preemption in international law, preemption has been taken to mean "marked by the seizing of the initiative: initiated by oneself."
79 The semantic analysis is more than a academic exercise. In strategic debates practical consequences result from the use and misuse of prevention and preemption. Each word has its own semantic meaning, the NSS and the public discussion uses them, more or less, interchangeably. For example, NSS chapter 5, intended to define and outline the concept of preemption, uses the word "prevent" in the heading to summarize the chapter's content. But he text of this chapter comprises several "preemption terms" like "legitimacy of preemption" or "preemption action" or "preempt emerging threats." 80 By using both terms the NSS can be interpreted in many different ways.
With regard to the GWOT the NSS describes the only way of defending peace and security as a "path of action," 81 this definition is forward leaning and proactive. The triangle of
Terrorists-Tyrants-Weapons of Mass Destruction changed the risk threshold: "the greater the treat, the greater the risk of inaction … even if uncertainty remains." 82 Deterrence works in a framework of rational thought and a balance of power. Classical deterrence had no relevance for the 19 Al Qaeda terrorists who hi-jacked four commercial airplanes on 9/11, slamming two into NSS silence on the circumstances that justify preemption raises another and more likely danger: In the future countries like Russia, China, and Israel will embrace the preemption argument as a cover for settling their own national security problems even more than they have done already in the past decades. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has argued, "It can not be in either American national interests or the world's interests to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of security." The NSS recognizes this problem by warning nations not to "use preemption as a pretext for aggression." But until the administration define the line separating justifiable preemption from unlawful aggression in a way that gains widespread adherence abroad, it risks seeing its words used to justify ends it opposes.
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While the ESS agreed with the NSS that a mixture of instruments is required to address the new threats, the European concept placed much less emphasis on the military component. The only time the ESS mentioned the necessity for military action is in connection with failed states.
The statement "military instruments may be needed to restore order" is embedded in the section stressing the importance of civilian crisis management and reconstruction tools. Also the use of the term "restore" in the ESS instead of "regime change" is an important difference to the NSS. In the ESS the use of military force is framed as a post conflict tool. "Regional conflicts need political solutions, but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase."
92 The ESS follows a preventive approach because "conflict prevention and threat Kagan "a majority of Europeans has come to doubt the legitimacy of US power and US global leadership. The US can not ignore this problem. The struggle to define and obtain international legitimacy may prove to be the most critical contests of our time. In some ways it is as significant in determining the future of the US role in the international system as any purely material measure of power and influence." 96 The ESS reaffirms that, as a matter of principle, the United Nation Security Council should remain the form that legitimizes the use of force. According to Joseph S. Nye proposes the following future approach: "The US should incline towards multilateralism whenever possible as a way to legitimize its power and to gain a broad acceptance of its NSS. Preemption that is legitimized by multilateral sanction is far less costly and sets a far less dangerous precedent than the US asserting that it can alone act as judge, jury and executioner."
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The relationship between the United States and Europe is in a deep crisis. According to Benjamin Barber, an internationally renowned American political theorist and Professor of civil society, the United States, by invoking a right to unilateral action, preventive war, and regime change has undermined the very framework of cooperation and international law that is necessary to fight the Global War on Terrorism. 101 The US behavior appears to many European countries as a hegemon, rather than a global leader concerned about the common good. This behavior is described by Robert W. Tucker and David C Hendrickson in their article on The Sources of American Legitimacy as follows: "World public opinion now sees the United States increasingly as an outlier -invoking international law when convenient, and ignoring it when not; using international institutions when they work to its advantage, and disdaining them when they pose obstacles to U.S. design." 102 Although the major differences about the ways to achieve the strategic goals are obvious, there is still a common transatlantic basis. position to tackle these threats and crises alone, they need each other.
As already elaborated in detail above, an effective Counter Terrorist Strategy has to attack not only terrorists themselves, but the ideology they are proclaiming, the economy they are living in, the political structure they are using, basically the context in which they are rooted. This requires a strategy to be simultaneously military, economic and political. Nye describes this concept as a three dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally: The classical interstate military issue is positioned on the top board. The US is likely to remain the only superpower for years to come, therefore it make sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity and hegemony. The interstate economic issues are played on the middle board, where the distribution of power is already multipolar. All the transnational issues belong on the bottom board, where power is widely distributed among states and non state actors. 103 From the European perspective the US administration is focused too heavily on military power alone. There is no doubt that military power is essential to global stability and that it is a critical part of the response to terrorism, but combating terrorism will take years of patience, unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing, common challenges we should ask the key question: What can be done to improve the US -EU relationship?
First, based on the European conviction that "no single country is able to tackle today's problems on its own" 105 and the American recognition that "to defeat terrorism in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends," 106 Europe and the United States are constructively working on a couple of substantial issues of common concerns: Balkans, Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, as well as the fight against terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These issues prove on a daily basis that we do not have the luxury of wasting time when finding common solutions.
Second, the United States should use collective instruments and institutions working for them, rather than weaken or destroy them. The NSS emphasizes ad hoc coalitions as preferred means for addressing threats to international security and underestimates the contribution that broad-based coalition alliances and institutions, like United Nation, NATO or in the future the European Union, make over the long term. It is easy to dismiss EU as a permanently divided and weak actor. That would be an understandable conclusion looking at the Iraq cris and EU failure to produce a coherent common policy. But there is an expectation that EU member states will try to speak with one voice on foreign policy issues. There is a regognition that as a more or less unitary actor on a number of issues such as trade, the EU should also act unified in security issues. The EU, as robust civilian power, will not be not only a "partner in opening world trade" as reference in the NSS, but intent to be an accepted partner in security policy as well. The European approach should be taken seriously. With the ESS the EU has a general framework to think and act strategically.
Third, the Europeans must recognize that a partner, who offers very often only criticism, but has no real potential contribution to make, will be of little consequence. Europeans have to 105 ESS, 1. 106 NSS, 7.
learn that political consultations are not an end in themselves. Their value depends on whether the partner consulted can make a difference to the outcome. The United States will not be part of any decision that is not in line with its national security interests. Multilateral action will only be considered if it is beneficial to the United States. Calls for more multilateralism in decisionmaking will require Europe to be willing and able to accept more responsibility for carry out commitments.
Fourth, the EU credibility as a foreign policy and security actor will depend on translating this strategy into plans and operations. This is particularly true because of the ESS emphasis on threats; thereby it creates an expectation that the EU will do what is necessary to assume responsibility for the threats identified in the document. According to Sten Rynning "Coercive power demands executive authority to make decisions and command resource."
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Therefore the effective implementation of the strategy is thus linked to the institutional reform of the EU that the new constitution should provide. The success of the EU depends on the will to take action. The EU must be able to implement all instruments described in the ESS, including coercive use of force. Military power is of course not the only frame of reference for action on the international scene, but it remains an essential card and the EU has no other choice to have that card in its hand to back up diplomacy by firmness and force. What counts is not so much the size of the armed forces, but the willingness and the ability to use them. 108 Therefore the EU need not a military capacity that equal to the US Forces, but a sufficient force strength and an appropriate force structure to play the military card within the comprehensive security concept and to be taken serious as " robust civilian power" by the superpower United States. The overall aim is to be able to act as a complementary security element. The defense capabilities of the EU must not be created as a counterweight to the United States, rather they should encourage synergies. 
